Stability in Supply Chain Networks

By Michael Ostrovsky. 2005

302 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d39ff34f6400f30f973ba5c69442069b5ee450a7

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, background): “• assigning children to daycare places in Denmark [375]; • school placement in Boston [1, 4], Hungary [77, 90], New York [2] and Singapore [567](11); • higher education admission in China [593,594], Germany [111], Hungary [77, 90], Spain [491] and Turkey [64, 60, 61]); • awarding tuition exchange sc”
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “…matching.3 It then observes that the algorithm often fails to find a stable matching when there are couples and argues that a main problem of the mechanism is that (prior to the 1983 match) it did not allow couples to report preferences over pairs of positions, one for each member of the couple.”
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013, methodology): “This equivalence is shown by Reijnierse et al. (2002), Fujishige and Yang (2003), and Lien and Yan (2003).”
Bilateral Contract Networks for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading (2019, background): “In [26], full substitutability is presented as a key stability condition for agents operating in a hierarchical supply chain.”
Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, methodology): “The multi-unit (or vector) version of the same-side substitutability (SSS) and the cross-side complementarity (CSC) of Ostrovsky (2008) can be formulated for a correspondence C : ZN → 2Z as follows, where, for any z ∈ ZN , the subvector of z on U is denoted by zU ∈ ZU and similarly the subvector on ”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “Adachi (2000) gives a characterization of stable matchings in terms of fixed points of an operator over prematchings.6 This insight has been widely applied in the matching with contracts literature (see, e.g., Hatfield and Milgrom 2005; Ostrovsky 2008; Echenique 2012).”
Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, methodology): “In Section 3, we introduce the COSM and 8Recent contributions in this research program include Hatfield and Kojima (2008, 2010), Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Ostrovsky (2008), and Westkamp (2010).”