The Resolution of Technical Default

By M. Beneish, E. Press. 2000

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d278f05bfef7f513ec0a3919e58e15256a64ce35

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Citations in the corpus

Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements (2009, unknown): “For example, deteriorating performance can lead to covenant violations, or an increased probability of covenant violations, which in turn leads to increases in interest rates and reductions in allowable borrowings in many instances (e.g., Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995).”
Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants (2009, unknown): “Such contingent covenants would naturally follow in our model, to the extent that new investments primarily transfer wealth from lenders to shareholders only in certain verifiable states (i.e., when the firm is in or near financial distress).”
On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships (2009, background): “In particular, if a borrower violates a covenant, then it is in “technical default” and the loan contract is usually renegotiated but can be terminated (see e.g. Chen & Wei 1993; Beneish & Press 1995; Chava & Roberts 2005).”
The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, unknown): “…it might not be surprising that covenant 3 A number of studies examine the implications of covenant violation, including Smith and Warner (1979), Beneish and Press (1993, 1995), Chen and Wei (1993), Smith (1993), Sweeny (1994), Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009a), and Nini,…”
Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (2009, background): “The importance of covenant violations has been recognized in the accounting literature since the 1990s (Beneish and Press (1993, 1995), Chen and Wei (1993), Smith (1993), and Sweeney (1994)).”
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “In line with these operational and governance changes, firms violating covenants also experience a higher cost of debt financing (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995, Sweeney, 1994, and Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009).”
Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-Selling (2011, background): “11 There are also a number of studies that focus primarily on the outcome and implications of violations of covenants, see, e.g., Beneish and Press (1995), Smith (1993), Chava and Roberts (2008), and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009).”
Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain (2016, background): “To avoid debt covenant iolation, managers of highly leveraged firms have incenives to make income-increasing discretionary accruals. owever, high leverage is also associated with financial istress (Beneish and Press, 1995).”
Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management (2013, unknown): “Prior research regarding the use of AEM to avoid technical default reports mixed results but concludes that managers’ incentives to avoid default vary across firms (Beneish and Press 1993, 1995; Dichev and Skinner 2002).”