A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing

By Paul D. Oyer. Journal of Labor Economics, 2000

136 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d183d506d3edd9480469edb1518e6e99ce4b0436

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Tomasz Obloj
2. Harikesh S. Nair
3. Douglas H. Frank
4. Sanjog Misra

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Tomasz Obloj
2. Harikesh S. Nair
3. Douglas H. Frank
4. Sanjog Misra

In Safety Research

1. Tomasz Obloj
2. Harikesh S. Nair
3. Douglas H. Frank
4. Sanjog Misra

Citations in the corpus

• Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking (2014, background): “This incentive design—featuring sales quotas with discrete bonus echelons—is the most widespread structure of sales compensation (Larkin, 2013; Oyer, 2000).”
• A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation (2009, background): “Such quotas are ubiquitous in salesforce compensation and have been justified in the theory literature as a tradeoff between the optimal provision of incentives versus the cost of implementing more complicated schemes (Raju and Srinivasan 1996), or as optimal under specific assumptions on agent pref”