OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN CONGLOMERATES:FACTS AND HYPOTHESES FOR GOVERNANCE

By F. Lefort, E. Walker. 2000

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Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence From Public Companies in Chile (2007, background): “…mechanisms for minority shareholders, an issue of special relevance given the fact that the dominant property structure in Chilean firms is that of a controlling shareholder: 60 of the largest publicly traded companies have a shareholder controlling 68% of the shares (Lefort & Walker, 2000).”
Corporate Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile) (2005, background): “Lefort and Walker (2000, 2004) find that firm affiliation to groups tends to decrease their value but this is mitigated when there is little separation between control and cash flow rights and when pension funds are present as minority shareholders.”
A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups (2005, unknown): “The authors conclude that, in Germany, pyramids are not used as a device to achieve control.25 In a study of ownership and control of Chilean rms, Lefort and Walker (1999) nd that the controlling shareholder owns more cash ow than necessary to achieve control.”
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “They are also a major source of debt financing to these companies (Iglesias-Palau, 2000; Lefort and Walker, 2000a).”