Strategic delegation : An experiment

By Chaim Fershtman, Uri Gneezy. 2001

156 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ce244044ba008d1c0a7c55dcf94624d807cc6a37

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. John H. Kagel
2. Roberto A. Weber
3. George Loewenstein
4. Robert A. Ritz
5. Eric Van den Steen

In Safety Research

1. John H. Kagel
2. George Loewenstein
3. Roberto A. Weber
4. K. Wolfe
5. Robert A. Ritz
6. Matthias Sutter
7. Adam M. Grant
8. Roland Bénabou

Citations in the corpus

• Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship (2010, background): “In Rounds 1 through 4, sharing in the Agent conditions was not significantly lower than in the Baseline.”
• Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility (2008, unknown): “Huck, Müller and Normann (2004) provide experimental evidence on strategic delegation in oligopolistic markets, Schotter, Zheng and Snyder (2000) and Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) in bargaining situations.”
• Strategic incentives for market share (2008, background): “In stage 2, each agent chooses an output level, qi, to maximize his compensation as given by (4).”
• Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game (2001, background): “However, see Fershtman and Gneezy (2001, p. 360) which suggests that rejections that would damage an “innocent” third party helps increase the proposer’s share in a two-person ultimatum game.”