Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets
By D. Aigner, G. Cain. 1977
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Andrea Romei
- Salvatore Ruggieri
- Zachary Chase Lipton
- David H. Autor
- Vikram V. Ramaswamy
- Angelina Wang
- Mahmood Arai
- Yoshua Bengio
Citations in the corpus
- European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a "Right to Explanation" (2016, neutral): “those with smaller confidence intervals [2])”
- Efficient candidate screening under multiple tests and implications for fairness (2019, background): “Many subsequent works extend this analysis, typically focusing on Gaussian models of worker quality and conditionally-Gaussian test scores [2, 1].”
- How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection? (2004, background): “Substituting (1) and (2) into the above condition, we can solve for e m to obtain, e m = m̄− (r + γ) c φa ,”
- Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records (2004, methodology): “Bushway (1996) specified a formal economic model of statistical discrimination (Aigner & Cain, 1977) to study the impact of criminal history record policy on participants of the labor market.”
- Teachers’ Bias Against the Mathematical Ability of Female, Black, and Hispanic Students (2019, background): “These findings support theories of bias and discrimination that posit that biases are apparent in low-information situations (e.g., Aigner & Cain 1977; Arrow, 1973; Bertrand et al., 2005; Bertrand & Duflo, 2016; Dovidio et al., 1998; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Phelps, 1972).”
- Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes (2014, methodology): “The larger returns for majority candidates are suggestive evidence in favor of the statistical discrimination model with heterogeneous signal quality (Aigner and Cain, 1977). The nonsignificant effect of interrupted labor market history for minority candidates also corroborates the findings by Kroft”
- Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments (2008, methodology): “…of x stands in contrast to several models of statistical discrimination in which testing is differentially informative (or uninformative) for minority groups due to their higher (lower) underlying productivity variance, e.g., Aigner and Cain (1977), Lundberg and Startz (1983), and Masters (2006).”