How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?
By Adriana D. Kugler, G. Saint‐Paul. Journal of Labor Economics, 2004
238 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4dba8fd2c745aceaf5d5ee3268fe46da70e15a1
Citations in the corpus
- Protective or Counter-Productive? Labor Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives (2003, unknown): “Kugler and Saint-Paul (2003) look at the interaction between employment protection and the re-employment prospects of workers subject to individual shocks.”
- Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation (2013, unknown): “Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) consider re-employment probabilities.”
- Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States (2007, unknown): “8 Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) …nd using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that these protections (especially the good faith exception) reduced the re-employment probability of unemployed relative to employed workers, suggesting that dismissal protections exacerbated adverse selection into…”
- Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States (2007, unknown): “…in adopting states substituted temporary help agency workers for direct-hire employees, presumably in an effort to minimise litigation risks.8 Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that these protections (especially the good faith exception)…”