Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India

By Shawn Cole. 2008

442 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66d5b9bad1810f339a8d428171d4fad42ca074ff

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Bank ownership type and banking relationships (2006, unknown): “In some cases, they have also been found to subsidize or direct credit for political purposes (e.g., Cole, 2004; 13 In countries with low judicial efficiency and weak property rights, banks might have a greater incentive to refinance to avoid going to the courts.”
Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the “New” Fertilizer Subsidies (2011, background): “However, there is also evidence that politicians engage in targeting swing voters, as in Cole (2009) who finds that Indian state governments supplied more subsidized agricultural loans in election years to districts in which they had a narrow margin of victory or a loss.”
Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana (2011, background): “…which evidence of politically motivated targeting of intergovernmental transfers emerges varies from Albania (Case, 2001), India (Khemani, 2007; Cole 2009; Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta, 2009), Argentina (Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001) Portugal (Pereira, 1996; Veiga and Pinho, 2007),…”
Access to Financial Services (2009, background): “One of the reasons is that lending decisions are based on the political cycle rather than socio-economic fundamentals, as both cross-country evidence and a carefully executed case study for India show (Cole 2004; Dinc¸ 2005).”
Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending (2017, unknown): “Cole (2009) also finds clear effects of political capture among government-owned banks in India where the amount of agricultural credit is related to the electoral cycle and the largest increases in lending occur in districts in which elections are particularly close.”