Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

By Dan S. Dhaliwal, Cristi A. Gleason, Lillian F. Mills. 2004

563 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cc6efa6f1f118be44b1d15c1d4b8c850249e4991

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The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Michelle Hanlon
2. Terry Shevlin
3. Liandong Zhang
4. Edward L. Maydew
5. Ryan J. Wilson
6. Shivaram Rajgopal
7. Jennifer Blouin
8. G. He

In Finance

1. Shivaram Rajgopal
2. G. He
3. John (Xuefeng) Jiang
4. Liandong Zhang
5. Weili Ge
6. Catherine Schrand
7. Terry Shevlin
8. Patricia M. Dechow

In Strategy and Management

1. G. He
2. Shivaram Rajgopal
3. Terry Shevlin
4. Weili Ge
5. Liandong Zhang
6. Edward L. Maydew
7. John (Xuefeng) Jiang
8. Catherine Schrand

Citations in the corpus

• The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, methodology): “A stream of prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Moehrle 2002; McVay et al. 2006; Ayers et al. 2006) provides evidence that earnings are likely managed when firms just meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts.”
• Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “Moreover, the level of UTB can also be affected by managers’ earnings management activities (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2004).”
• An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distributions (2007, unknown): “Dhaliwal et al. (2004) examine whether firms manage ETR's to meet consensus analyst earnings forecasts for a sample of firms with positive pretax income.”
• Economic consequences of increasing the conformity in accounting for uncertain tax benefits (2008, background): “Prior research suggests managers use discretion in accounting for uncertain tax benefits to meet key earnings targets or smooth earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Gupta and Laux 2007; Blouin and Tuna 2007).”
• Credit Ratings and Taxes: The Effect of Book–Tax Differences on Ratings Changes (2008, background): “2006) and anecdotally (financial statement analysis texts), we expect that book-tax differences may be an informative signal of earnings quality because firms manage earnings upward via temporary and permanent differences (Phillips et al. 2003; Dhaliwal et al. 2004), large book-tax differences are l”
• Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments (2010, background): “Finally, firms engaging in earnings management to meet or beat earnings targets might use tax accounts to manage their book earnings (Phillips et al. 2003; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Badertscher et al. 2009).”
• Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations in the Post-Scandals World: Changes in Stock Market Rewards and Managerial Actions (2008, background): “Researchers have also shown that in the pre-scandals world, managers relied extensively on accruals (e.g., Kasznik 1999, Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004) and expectations management (e.g. Matsumoto 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) to meet or beat analyst forecasts…”
• Audit Quality and the Trade-Off between Accretive Stock Repurchases and Accrual-Based Earnings Management (2012, methodology): “Consistent with prior research (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008; Gleason and Mills 2008), we limit the construction of SUSPECT_REPURCHASE1 to within five cents of analysts’ forecasts to reduce the influence of motivations for stock repurchases unrelated to efforts to manage EPS within our…”