Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments

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CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2014, background): “…pre-tax income to missing (230 firm observations), and winsorize the remaining ETRs so that the largest observation is one and the smallest is zero (Robinson et al. 2010, Dyreng et al. 2010).11 To ensure that all firms in my sample face a similar legal environment, I also eliminate firms that are…”
Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “Robinson et al. (2012)”
The Incentives for Tax Planning (2012, background): “Recent research presents evidence that variation in corporate tax planning is captured by ETRs (Dyreng et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2010).”
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field (2014, background): “We also ask questions to directly address the hypotheses put forth in Robinson et al. (2010), Armstrong et al. (2012) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009a, b).”
Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: An empirical analysis (2012, background): “First, recent empirical tax research has found that ETRs encapsulate tax aggressiveness (see, e.g., Slemrod, 2004; Dyreng et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., in press).”