The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers

By Omesh Kini, William A. Kracaw, Shehzad L. Mian. 2004

157 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7fa0c7d3945a1c9f9a4e464423fbffa299fde60c

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter? (2007, background): “According to Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2004) , the 1980s are marked by intense takeover activity, hostility, and less effective internal control mechanisms, while the 1990s are characterized by a less active takeover market but more involved alternative governance mechanisms.”
Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, unknown): “For example, if we follow the filter used in Kini et al. (1995) that focuses on tender offers where the percent of shares acquired in the target is at least 15% and the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the acquisition, we find the probability of turnover is 9.”
Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long-Term Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers (2006, background): “Consistent with this view, Kini et al. (2004) find that hostile bid target’s market to book value ratio was on average lower than that of friendly targets.”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “This hypothesis is consistent with the literature on corporate governance, which underscores the monitoring role of institutional shareholders (e.g., Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004; Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003).”
Why are firms unlevered (2012, unknown): “Several authors (e.g., Scharfstein (1988), Martin and McConnell (1991), Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2004)) suggest that an active takeover market serves to discipline underperforming managers.12 We use the percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC code that are delisted from 10 Morellec (2004) and…”
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital (2010, background): “…governance mechanisms in the United States to monitor and discipline managers (Manne (1965), Jensen (1988)).7 Consistent with this proposition, Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2004) show that during the period from 1979 to 1998, the probability of CEO turnover after a takeover is negatively…”
Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options (2006, background): “Also refer to Macey and O’Hara (2003) for an explanation of why fiduciary duties of directors should be extended to stakeholders other than shareholders in the case of financial firms.”