Consciousness in action

By David Woodruff Smith. Synthese, 2004

493 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c9fa858f9da6a3410cbf3cf7202b69c701351dc7

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Attacking the Bounds of Cognition (2006, background): “…tasks individually by manipulating external classical vehicles—obvious examples being written and spoken language and mathematical symbols—and sometimes by co-operating with other cognitive agents in the shared environment (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hurley, 1998; Menary, in press; Rowlands, 1999).”
Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance (2015, background): “As mentioned, however, one could argue that the separation between inner and outer promoted by this view is largely artificial (Hurley, 1998).”
Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism (2005, background): “…find the whole process of ‘seeing’ is better understood along the lines that Hurley has proposed when she rejects what she calls the classic ‘sandwich model’ and argues. that action and perception are related, at least in some instances, internally and not merely causally related (see Hurley 1998).”
Neural Plasticity and Consciousness (2003, unknown): “The change in qualitative expression cannot be explained in terms of a change in the peripheral source of visual inputs, as there has been no rerouting between peripheral inputs and their cortical targets and so there is no change in peripheral input source.”
THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE PERSONAL/SUBPERSONAL DISTINCTION (2012, background): “In some of the more recent literature, the personal/subpersonal distinction is applied to entities such as events (Hurley 1998), processes (Rowlands 2006), states (Machery 2009), contents (McGinn 1988), mechanisms (Metzinger 2003), and facts (Hornsby 2001).”
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception (2009, background): “Like others, I am skeptical that a general theoretical distinction that is both sharp and useful can be drawn here (Dennett 1991; Gazzaniga 1998; Hurley 1998; Koch 2004; Millikan 2004, chap.”
Mind in life : biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind (2007, background): “…is accordingly embodied and embedded in them as a ‘dynamic singularity’ — a knot or tangle of recurrent and reentrant processes centred on the organism (Hurley, 1998) — then the ‘astonishing hypothesis’ of neuroreductionism — that you are ‘nothing but a pack of neurons’ (Crick, 1994, p. 2) or that…”
Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition (2008, background): “The idea of enactive perception recently put forward by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), Hurley (1999), O’Regan and Noë (2001), and others, often with references to Merleau-Ponty, has been discussed at least since the end of the nineteenth century.”
Exaograms and Interdisciplinarity: history, the extended mind, and the civilizing process (2006, background): “…from the philosophical literature as closely related: active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998, reprinted in this volume), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003), locational externalism (Wilson 2004), environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), systemic anti-individualism (Butler 1998), and…”
Musical creativity and the embodied mind (2018, background): “In a sense, therefore, separating brain and body, perception and action, experience and behavior, may in fact be a largely artificial move that offers only limited accounts of what mental life really entails (Hurley, 1998, 2001; Thompson, 2007).”
Agency, simulation and self-identification (2004, background): “The second objection to the idea that intentions can be directly perceived has its source in an acceptance, implicit or explicit, of what Susan Hurley (1998) has called the Classical Sandwich Model, the view that perception and action are separate and peripheral, one an input system and the other…”
Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela (2004, background): “First, being “phenomenally conscious” of something would seem to entail being able to form intentions to act in relation to it (Hurley 1998, pp. 149–150).”
How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course (2009, background): “These include locational externalism (Wilson 2000, 2004a), environmentalism (Rowlands (1999), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998) and the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
Essentials of a Theory of Language Cognition (2019, background): “(Stepney, 2018, p. 30) The “Classical Sandwich” view (Hurley, 1998) of the serial operation and the modular separation of the three layers of perception → cognition → action fails to account for the dynamic relationships between action and perception in situated cognition.”