Neural Plasticity and Consciousness

By Susan Hurley, Alva Noë. 2003

253 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/252e6b6b539d945b38f34ca01d0f8455910d0f09

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy (2011, background): “Hurley and Noë, 2003, argue that some changes in the phenomenal character and content of conscious vision require only change in parts of a dynamic neuro-environmental system that lie outside the skull.”
Embodiment or envatment? Reflections on the bodily basis of consciousness (2010, background): “For example, somatic life-regulation processes contribute to affect and sense of self (Damasio 1999), and dynamic sensorimotor activity contributes to the qualitative content of perceptual experience (Hurley and Noë 2003).”
Definition and synergies of cognitive infocommunications (2012, background): “Some have argued that despite sensory substitution, the new stimuli should still be regarded as generating percepts from the original, substituted modality (this is known as the def-– erence thesis , e.g. as in [18]).”
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience (2005, background): “…of selfconsciousness will remain explanatorily opaque with respect to mental life as long as we understand them only in terms of their intrinsic neural properties and not in the dynamic sensorimotor context of the body as a whole (Thompson and Varela 2001; Hurley and Noë 2003; Legrand 2003).”
Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception (2006, background): “In a rich and interesting paper, Hurley and Noë (2003) draw our attention to the fact that there are two kinds of”
Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception (2009, background): “…based on respective basic premises can be delineated (Torrance 2005), in particular between the life–mind continuity brand of enaction (e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the dynamic sensorimotor account of perceptual consciousness (O'Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; Hurley and Noë 2003).”
Sensory substitution and the human-machine interface. (2003, background): “Sensory substitution is thus only possible because of brain plasticity [1,15, 16 ].”
Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment (2011, background): “…because they add a novel dimension at the side of experiencing.11 8 The complexity of the blind man’s cane is somewhat ignored by the deference thesis, in which the substituting modality (here touch) is overruled by the visual modality (the substituted modality) (cf. Hurley and Noë (2003).”
The Feeling Body: Toward an Enactive Approach to Emotion (2007, background): “A bodily representation would eventually cease to represent in its normal way were it not embedded in a web of processes linking it to the world and to the possibility of action in the world (see Hurley & Noë, 2003).”