Special Interest Politics

By Gene M. Grossman, E. Helpman. 2001

1,423 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c9b6b95d032bb0474e4960a2abd90bb89adf8475

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

On the Welfare Effects and Political Economy of Competition-Enhancing Policies (2004, methodology): “The model, developed by Acemoglu et al. (2002), is a simplified version of the lobbying model of Grossman and Helpman (2001).”
Evaluating efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries (2011, background): “8 experience a stronger motivation to create ’rents’ for public sector unions (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).”
Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey (2003, background): “Austen-Smith (1997) as well as Grossman and Helpman (2001) survey theoretical approaches to modeling lobbying activity.”
Migration and Foreign Aid (2015, background): “Grossman and Helpman 2001; for an application of lobbying in the context of foreign aid, see Pevehouse and Vabulas 2013b. 38.”
Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services (2006, positive): “Although several techniques are available, 7 See, for instance, Shestalova (2003). they recommend the Tobit procedure (especially when there are categorical variables) to regress the efficiency scores to a battery of variables that may explain relative technical efficiencies.”
Cohesion Policy in the European Union: Growth, Geography, Institutions (2011, positive): “…Ltd inappropriate for sustaining innovation and growth given their position relative to different types of frontiers (i.e. institutional, educational and, above all, the world technological frontier) (Persson et al., 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006).”
A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis (2009, neutral): “…appears to be consistent with information- based theories, which assert that lobbying fi rms have better information than the policymakers and partly reveal their information by endogenously choosing their lobbying effort (Potters and van Winden 1992; Lohmann 1995; Grossman and Helpman 2001).”
Games played through agents (2003, background): “The mixed-strategy equilibrium of similar two-agent two-principal game is studied, independently, by Grossman and Helpman (2001) in the context of lobbying.”
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right Divide on Trade Policy? (2004, background): “An enormous literature on the institutional conditions under which partisan competition as opposed to convergence should occur exists (e.g., Wittman, 1977, 1983; Calvert, 1985, 1996; Enelow and Hinich, 1990; Strom, 1990; Shepsle, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 2002).”
Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy (2005, background): “…to influence government behavior, through either explicit quid pro quos with legislators for constituency service or favorable votes (Baron 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994, 2001), improved access to legislators (Hall and Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986), or enhancement of the electoral prospects of…”
Revolving door lobbyists (2012, background): “…the value that lobbyists provide for their clients and, more generally, to assess the role of 1For instance, Wright (1990), Kollman (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2001), Ansolabehere et al. (2002), de Figuereido and Silverman (2006), Hall and Deardoff (2006), Baumgartner et al. (2009),…”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, background): “Since regulators have “ideologies,” a successful lobbyist must frame the information such that it is consistent with the lobbied regulator’s ideology (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).”