Revolving door lobbyists

By Jordi Blanes i Vidal, M. Draca, Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012

549 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/631a3a1bef9d81d50dc51f93e055f1961d95db8f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “A few recent papers have used difference-in-difference designs (Vidal et al. (2012)), instrumental variable approaches (De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006)), or have adopted a structural model (Kang (2015)) to address these difficulties.”
The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation (2014, unknown): “There is a larger body of work that explores the value of lobbying (see, Blanes I Vidal et al. (2012) and Bertrand et al.”
Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector (2016, background): “Blanes i Vidal et al. (2010) show evidence that the lobbying revenue of congressional sta ers turned lobbyists is greater than that of other lobbyists, and that the magnitude of this revenue di erence depends on the power of the congressional politicians for whom they have worked in the past.”
Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney (2012, background): “…correlation between various measures of firm-level connections to government, such as lobbying, PAC expenditures, and politically affiliated board members, and measures of firm success (for example, Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Jayachandran,2006; Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Igan and Mishra,2012).”
The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States (2016, unknown): “Blanes-i-Vidal, J., M. Draca, C. Fons-Rosen, 2012.”
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying (2014, methodology): “Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012) quantify how valuable ‘who you know’ is to the lobbyist.”
Is it Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process (2011, unknown): “Hence, our connection measure, while certainly noisy, arguably correlates with strong ties.20 We also compare our measure of connections to the one recently proposed by Blanes-i-Vidal et al (2012).”
Revolving Doors on Wall Street (2016, background): “Similarly, Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012) document the effects on lobbyist revenues of employing ex-government staffers and conclude that lobbyists sell political access.”