Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking?

By F. Revelli. 2001

196 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c818b3bbe987566938915088d177f0814cb52091

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands (2005, background): “3 (2001) metropolitan districts, England Revelli (2002a) Nonmetropolitan districts, England Property tax (tax rates) ML and IV 0.”
Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities (2007, unknown): “…the literature that search for this mimicking behaviour by looking for spatial correlation between tax rates and/or tax changes in neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998, Feld et al. 2001, Revelli, 2001; Bordignon et al ., 2003 and 2004, and Solé-Ollé, 2003).”
Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision (2006, unknown): “How to Protect Low-income Workers in the Industrialized Countries against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration, August 2004 1266 Wolfgang Leininger, Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games, August 2004 1267 Antoine Bommier and Bertrand Villeneu”
Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities (2008, background): “Empirical studies that use the IV approach to estimate spatial coefficients are Ladd (1992), Kelejian and Robinson (1993), Brett and Pinske (2000), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Figlio et al. (1999), Buettner (2001), and Revelli (2001) .”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “Fiscal competition models are typically implemented empirically by means of estimation of a fiscal reaction function, where the optimal tax rate in a jurisdiction depends on the tax rates in nearby jurisdictions (Brett and Pinkse, 2000; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2001; Hayashi and Boadw”
Does `Smart Growth' Matter to Public Finance? (2008, background): “…types of spillovers and their behavioral mechanisms is a complicated venture in-and-of-itself: See, for example, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), Revelli (2001, 2002, 2003), Bordignon et al. (2003), Lundberg (2006), and Solé-Ollé (2006). categories of factors, pertaining to the cost of and…”
Some recent developments in spatial panel data models (2010, methodology): “for the information on the data collection, 15 see Shiue (2002)).”
In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting (2003, background): “[23], Brett and Pinkse [16], Saavedra [32], Revelli [29–31], and Sole-”
Testing the taxmimicking versus expenditure spill-over hypotheses using English data (2002, methodology): “and are spatially autocorrelated ± such as common shocks to income and tax base, that may result from central government regional policies or intermediate level of government ®scal policies (Revelli, 2001).”