In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting

By M. Bordignon, Floriana Cerniglia, F. Revelli. 2003

364 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b7e8f19178c74e9a9a226e434e5f2b27b4192e7

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Citations in the corpus

Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates (2008, neutral): “The latter occurs when voters in a tax jurisdiction use the taxes (and expenditures) set by their own political representative relative to those in neighboring jurisdictions to evaluate the performance of their representative (Besley and Case, 1995; Besley and Smart, 2007; Bordignon et al., 2003).”
A Race to the Bottom in Labour Standards? An Empirical Investigation (2011, positive): “Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) utilize spatial econometrics to find positive spatial lags which they interpret as evidence of yardstick competition.”
On model specification and parameter space definitions in higher order spatial econometric models (2012, background): “…use in the spatial econometrics literature, e.g. Brandsma and Ketellapper (1979), Sherrell (1990), Hepple (1995), Bell and Bocksteal (2000), Bordignon et al. (2003), Lacombe (2004), Allers and Elhorst (2005), McMillen et al. (2007), Ward and Gleditsch (2008), Dall'Erba et al. (2008),…”
Does `Smart Growth' Matter to Public Finance? (2008, background): “…behavioral mechanisms is a complicated venture in-and-of-itself: See, for example, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), Revelli (2001, 2002, 2003), Bordignon et al. (2003), Lundberg (2006), and Solé-Ollé (2006). categories of factors, pertaining to the cost of and demand for public services, are…”
Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision (2006, neutral): “[12]) that, if voters knew the non-stochastic determinants of local expenditures in own and neighboring jurisdictions, yardstick competition would yield correlation only among the unpredicted components of local expenditures - that is the residual "i in equation (9).”
Evidence of Political Yardstick Competition in France Using a Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Model with Fixed Effects (2009, neutral): “30 by Bordignon et al. (2003); and 0.35 by Allers and Elhorst (2005)—studies that do not control for spatial and time-period fixed effects.”
Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands (2005, background): “Following Besley and Case (1995) and Bordignon et al. (2003), it seems that this issue is related to the type of spatial econometric model that is eventually chosen as the best candidate to describe the data.”
Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities (2016, methodology): “…the interdependence of state expenditures, Brueckner (1998) on interdependence in the choice of growth-control measures by cities in California, Bordignon et al. (2003) that estimate local property tax equation based on Italian data,5 Fredriksson et al. (2004) that study strategic behavior in…”
Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy (2017, background): “(1993), Bordignon et al. (2003) and Lyytikäinen (2012). 14Summary statistics of each variable are reported in Table 2.”
Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “For empirical evidence of yardstick competition see Besley and Case (1995b) for United States), Ashworth and Heyndels (1997) for Flemish Belgium, Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) for Italy, Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002) for Switzerland and Revelli (2006) for the United Kingdom.”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “The unfortunate empirical consequence of incumbent governments’ “rent mimicking” behavior, though, is that one would virtually be unable to discriminate a non-behavioral spatial pattern due to exogenous auto-correlation in cost shocks (equation (22)), from a spatial pattern of rent mimicking (wi ) (”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…on the government, which is no longer able to generate a cycle (see, in a similar vein, Besley and Case 1995; Streb 1999; Grier and Grier 2000; Bordignon et al. 2003; Rose 2006, 2008; Alt and Rose 2007; Klein 2010; Aidt et al. 2011; Benito et al. 2013b; Sjahrir et al. 2013; Klein and Sakurai…”
Revealed yardstick competition: Local government efficiency patterns in Norway (2007, background): “6 See Besley and Case [7], Bivand and Szymanski [9,10] and Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli [11,12].”
Linear Spatial Dependence Models for Cross-Section Data (2014, background): “Examples are Brandsma and Ketellapper (1979), Sherrell (1990), Hepple (1995), Bell and Bockstael (2000), Bordignon et al. (2003), Lacombe (2004), Allers and Elhorst (2005), McMillen et al. (2007), Ward and Gleditsch (2008); Dall’Erba et al. (2008), Elhorst and Fréret (2009), Lee and Liu (2010),…”