Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision

By F. Revelli. Social Science Research Network, 2006

216 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends, by lessening local information spill-overs, to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto-correlation among local government expenditures. It analyses UK local government expenditures on personal social services before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system (SSPR, Social Services Performance Rating) that would attribute a rating to each local authority. The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of the SSPR has substantially reduced policy mimicking among neighboring jurisdictions.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b688da23904993054086bd4f4451d3c2155bdc7

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Citations in the corpus

Health Care Expenditure and Income in the OECD Reconsidered: Evidence from Panel Data (2010, unknown): “6 A recent strand of literature in health economics has suggested a number of reasons why one should expect geographical concentration of unobservable risk factors of health care spending (Revelli, 2006, Moscone and Knapp, 2005, and Moscone et al. 2007).”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “Similarly, in an analysis of local provision of personal social services in the UK, Revelli (2004) finds that spatial auto-correlation in local spending drops significantly after the introduction of a national assessment system that has the main objective of improving public information on local g”
Strategic interaction in local governments’ industrial land supply: Evidence from China (2017, methodology): “As each city decides to lease out industrial land at a certain price according to the decisions of neighbouring governments’ industrial land leasing behaviours and its own city characteristics (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2006), we used city characteristics as control variables.”
Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “For empirical evidence of yardstick competition see Besley and Case (1995b) for United States), Ashworth and Heyndels (1997) for Flemish Belgium, Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) for Italy, Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002) for Switzerland and Revelli (2006) for the United Kingdom.”