Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands

By Maarten A. Allers, J. Paul Elhorst. 2005

324 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/882dee33ae71fa3ced8b90b2e4e0d321dfe135f0

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Citations in the corpus

Revealed yardstick competition: Local government efficiency patterns in Norway (2007, unknown): “50[1] (0.”
On model specification and parameter space definitions in higher order spatial econometric models (2012, background): “…e.g. Brandsma and Ketellapper (1979), Sherrell (1990), Hepple (1995), Bell and Bocksteal (2000), Bordignon et al. (2003), Lacombe (2004), Allers and Elhorst (2005), McMillen et al. (2007), Ward and Gleditsch (2008), Dall'Erba et al. (2008), Elhorst and Fréret (2009), Lee and Liu (2010),…”
Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons (2009, unknown): “With the exception of Besley and Case (1995), the literature has, however, difficulties to establish a link between tax mimicking and the re-election of representatives such that a positive spatial correlation of tax rates could either be interpreted as evidence for tax competition or for yardstick ”
Linear Spatial Dependence Models for Cross-Section Data (2014, background): “Interaction effects among the error terms may also be interpreted to reflect a mechanism to correct rent-seeking politicians for unanticipated fiscal policy changes (Allers and Elhorst 2005).”
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION? (2013, background): “…(2001, 2003)), Belgian municipalities (Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998)), and municipalities in British Columbia (Brett and Pinkse (2000)), Boston (Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Milan (Bordignon, et al. (2003)), Barcelona (Solé-Ollé (2003)) and dutch municipalities (Allers and Elhorst (2005).”
A Race to the Bottom in Labour Standards? An Empirical Investigation (2011, background): “Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) utilize spatial econometrics to find positive spatial lags which they interpret as evidence of yardstick competition.”
Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from a property tax reform in Finland (2012, unknown): “Allers and Elhorst (2005) provide a table of nearly twenty empirical studies on local tax competition including studies using the SL and SIV methods.”
On The Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions (2008, background): “The rigorous development of the concept of "yardstick competition," for example, provides a provocative and potentially rich idea of the way in which fiscal decentralization may promote accountability in local finance (e.g., Brueckner (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005)).”
Effects of Unit-Based Garbage Pricing: A Differences-in-Differences Approach (2010, unknown): “Apart from tax adoption, tax rates have been found to depend on tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions; see Allers and Elhorst (2005) for an overview of empirical studies.”
Strategic interaction in local governments’ industrial land supply: Evidence from China (2017, background): “…Case (1995); 0.28 (welfare spending interaction effect) estimated by Elhorst and Freret (2009); 0.35 (property tax interaction effect) offered by Allers and Elhorst (2005); 0.6 (non-tax revenue interaction effect) estimated by Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002); and 0.8 (expenditures interaction…”