Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations

By J. Rochet, Jean Tirole. 2002

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c78594f1f708b37c907aa982ad93f334ad126b6b

Citations in the corpus

• Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries (2003, unknown): “Merchants will not take a payment card if no customer carries it because no transaction will materialize.”
• Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003, unknown): “Schmalensee (2002) extends Baxter’s analysis by considering issuers and acquirers with market power.”
• The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems (2003, unknown): “The possibility that credit card interchange fees are neutral has also been observed by Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2001b); each in models with very specific assumptions.8 Taken together these results suggest a greater generality to neutrality than has previously been argued.”
• Platform competition in two sided markets (2003, unknown): “4 This literature however assumes either that there is a monopoly platform (Baye and Morgan 2001, Rochet and Tirole 2002, Schmalensee 2002) or that platforms are fully interconnected (Laffont, Marcus, Rey, Tirole 2003) and so end-users enjoy the same level of connectivity regardless of the platform…”
• Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature (2020, unknown): “…contributed to our understanding of platforms also emerged over this time frame: two-sided markets (e.g., Argentesi & Filistrucchi, 2007; Armstrong, 2006; Bolt & Tieman, 2008; Y. Chen & Xie, 2007; Hagiu, 2009; Kaiser & Wright, 2006; Lin, Li, & Whinston, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2006).”
• Optimal Card Payment Systems (2002, unknown): “The existing literature on payment systems has tended to either emphasize the role of interchange fees in balancing demand by cardholders and merchants so as to maximize network beneKts – see Baxter (1983), Chang and Evans (2000), Rochet and Tirole (2002) , and Schmalensee (2002) – or, as with Fran”
• The Economics of Credit Cards, Debit Cards and Atms: A Survey and Some New Evidence (2008, unknown): “Saloner and Shepard (1995) use data from the introductions of ATMs to test various predictions from the networks economics literature. An important prediction of the network literature is that the value of a network to its users increases, as the number of locations in the network increases which is”
• Explaining Adoption and Use of Payment Instruments by U.S. Consumers (2016, unknown): “There is a substantial literature studying interchange fees, such as Rochet and Tirole (2002).”