Optimal Card Payment Systems
By Julian Wright. 2002
210 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Media Technology, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9bb1590b3772b6b75868a6f5f4431f7b65e47205
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
In Media Technology
- Roberto Roson
- Jean-Charles Rochet
- Jean Tirole
- Bruno Jullien
- S. Chakravorti
- Andrei Hagiu
- Julian Wright
- Justus Haucap
In Strategy and Management
- Roberto Roson
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-Charles Rochet
- Bruno Jullien
- S. Chakravorti
- Andrei Hagiu
- Julian Wright
- Justus Haucap
Citations in the corpus
- Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products (2009, unknown): “This literature has experienced a recent revival in the branch of industrial organization that studies multi-sided markets.”
- Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, methodology): “The difficulties associated with the application of conventional guidelines for antitrust policy is briefly considered in the fifth section, based on Evans (2003) and Wright (2003c).”
- MUST-TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS (2011, unknown): “It elaborates on previous theoretical analyses (surveyed in Rochet (2003)) of the impact of IFs, in particular Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2003a, 2003b, 2004).”
- Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks (2006, background): “Unlike Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Guthrie and Wright (2003), we consider network benefits that are platform-specific.”
- Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries (2004, methodology): “Then it is optimal for the intermediary to use a direct control of the price p̂, to raise the surplus from trade, as in Wright (2003), and then to use transaction 11 fees tC and tP to recoup the profit and to control for the participation levels of both side.”
- Two-sided markets: a progress report (2006, background): “The nonneutrality of fixed fees is most dramatically illustrated by the following extreme but telling example, due to Wright (2003): Suppose that consumers all derive the same per-transaction surplus b B from the convenience of paying merchants by card rather than by cash, and that merchants are…”
- Competing Payment Schemes (2007, unknown): “If the average surplus to those using cards increases when the interchange fee is increased above a∗, 16This result, along with all others stated in this section, are derived formally in Guthrie and Wright (2003).”