Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation

By D. Neumark. 2003

489 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c77bf6ef85687f08d6f367d8b0f87241bc90c116

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In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns (2008, background): “Finally, fairness concerns may play a role as an equilibrium selection device, as argued in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998)7 and judgments regarding the fairness of performance evaluations are important whenever performance cannot be objectively assessed (MacLeod 2003).”
Moment Inequalities and Their Application (2015, methodology): “However, an employer can use a coarse signal on relative performance (6)See MacLeod (2003), p.”
CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect (2009, unknown): “Other research examines a Lake Wobegon Effect in employee evaluations, where supervisors are unwilling to rate employees honestly and thus mark everyone as above average (Moran and Morgan, 2001; MacLeod, 2003 ).”
Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools (2006, methodology): “In a single agent setting, MacLeod (2003) shows that if both parties observe the non-verifiable signal y, then it is possible to construct a message game and a corresponding outcome function (that involves the use of a third party) so as to achieve secondbest performance in equilibrium (Proposition ”
Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012, unknown): “Levin (2003), MacLeod (2003) and Fuchs (2007) consider asymmetric information about the outcome variable.”
Human Resource Management and Productivity (2010, background): “…supervisors‟ decisions in their favor (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1988)18; (ii) there may be favoritism on the behalf of supervisors for particular workers (Prendergast and Topel, 1996)19; (iii) the supervisor and employee may hold different opinions about employee‟s performance (MacLeod, 2003).”