Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies
By Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen. 2000
1,356 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c50b51af1d8cd534d76dbbf8cf56a798d375d43b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Mike W. Peng
- Mike Wright
- Igor Filatotchev
- Alfredo De Massis
- Marc van Essen
- Andrea Calabro
- Shaker A. Zahra
- Ruth V. Aguilera
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- Andrea Calabro
- Marc van Essen
- Mike Wright
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- Mike W. Peng
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Pietro Mazzola
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Performance of Indian Firms: The Effect of Board Size and Ownership (2005, background): “Firms’ ownership structure is the most researched indicator of corporate governance (Morck et al., 1988; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Ramaswamy et al., 2002).”
- Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective (2007, background): “A fast-growing literature, mostly in the finance area, examines the claim that publicly owned firms with a large family blockholder may perform better (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).”
- Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, methodology): “In Asia, (continental) Europe, and Latin America, the vast majority of large, publicly traded firms are family owned and controlled (Ahlstrom et al., 2004; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; de Miguel et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2001; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998, 2002; La Porta e”
- Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “…that different types of institutional owners do not have the same preferences (David et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), Aguilera and Jackson (2003, p. 450) note that researchers in comparative or cross-national governance have not given…”
- The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants (2003, background): “What the salient national differences in corporate governance are and how they should best be conceptualized remain hotly debated (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; O’Sullivan, 2000; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Prowse, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000 ).”
- “SEW” What Do We Know and Where Do We Go? A Review of Socioemotional Wealth and a Way Forward (2020, background): “All firms manage multiple objectives; however, for family-owned firms, the preservation of nonfinancial goals is thought to be a point of departure from their nonfamily peers (Sharma et al., 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).”
- Corporate governance, ownership structure and performance of SMEs in Ghana: implications for financing opportunities (2007, background): “Other studies however indicated that entrepreneurs and managers of founding family firms are more likely to engage in managerial entrenchment to the detriment of the firm, resulting in weaker performance ( Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000”
- Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, neutral): “However, extensive research has documented that the relation between ownership structure and firm value is nonlinear as a result of the monitoring and expropriation effects, and the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment phenomena, in the case of ownership concentration and insider ownership, res”
- VALUE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. FIRMS (2002, result): “This result is consistent with that described in Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), who find that bank ownership is associated with higher shareholder value for their sample of large European companies.”
- Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “…outs, but positively associated with the firm's market value Steiner (1996) Blockholder ownership percentage Positively associated with Tobin's Q Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) Largest owner percentage Positively related to market (MBV) and accounting (ROA) performance Wright et al. (2002)…”