Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth

By Kaivan Munshi, Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2009

432 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9fda92c556fac3de0b245ece116d1d0f6bb249e6

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Citations in the corpus

Microeconomics of Technology Adoption (2010, neutral): “The second seems more restrictive particularly in the light of recent work showing the importance of caste networks in determining, for example, access to credit (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009).”
Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village India (2019, neutral): “0022-3808/2019/12701-0010$10.00 1”
Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh (2014, background): “Migrating away may undermine network ties, and this may be a hidden cost of migration (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009).”
Does Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste (2013, neutral): “Indeed, caste-based migration is very low in India (Munshi & Rosenzweig 2009), and, as Anderson (2011) argues using historical census data, caste proportions in villages and by implication districts have remained largely unchanged and are thus assumed to be exogenous.”
A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings (2011, background): “16. Interestingly, recent work by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) suggests migration in India is low because people don’t want to give up the insurance provided by informal networks.”
Location-based tax incentives: Evidence from India (2017, background): “As shown in Table 17, the rental rates do not change differentially and hence I assume the (42)For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) find that in rural areas permanent migration rates of men out of their origin villages were as low as 8.7 percent in 1999. (43)Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) mea”
Family Networks and School Enrolment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment (2007, background): “A number of mechanisms drive the presence of extended family members, such as the need for insurance and the choice of marriage partners for children (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), the value of services provided by social networks (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005), inheritance of land and other household”