Assortative Matching and Search
By Robert Shimer, Lones Smith. 2000
393 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c313d6e83e5f92d5ec946c66a54a5eba5b1d2696
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Thibaut Lamadon
- Elena Manresa
- S. Bonhomme
- Jan Eeckhout
- Thomas Sampson
- Philipp Kircher
- Marek Pycia
- Lones Smith
In Gender Studies
- Jan Eeckhout
- Philipp Kircher
- J. Lafortune
- Sonia Oreffice
- Kataŕına Borovičková
- Alp E. Atakan
- C. Quintana‐Domeque
- Thibaut Lamadon
Citations in the corpus
- Matching and Inequality in the World Economy (2010, background): “On the one hand, authors including Becker (1973), Heckman and Honore (1990), Shimer and Smith (2000), Legros and Newman (2002, 2007), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) offer general results focusing on crosssectional predictions, such as sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching to…”
- Selection into Trade and Wage Inequality (2014, background): “See Sattinger (1979) for the competitive labor market case, Shimer and Smith (2000) for a model with search based labor market frictions, and Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) for an open economy application.”
- Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs (2006, background): “Since s (x, y) = 4The statement is identical to Proposition 3 in Shimer and Smith (2000), where a proof can be found. f (x, y) − v (x) − v (x), if we assume that f (x, y) is symmetric and strictly supermodular, then so is the surplus function s (x, y).”
- Matching, Search, and Heterogeneity (2001, background): “Shimer and Smith (2000a) prove the existence of an equilibrium in a closely related model.”
- The Marriage Model with Search Frictions (2006, background): “Shimer and Smith (2000) revis- This paper revises a working paper submitted to this Journal in 1997.”
- Making Yourself Attractive: Pre-Marital Investments and the Returns to Education in the Marriage Market (2012, background): “It also renders the setting of Shimer and Smith (2000) much more complex and is thus not explored here.”
- Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition (2010, methodology): “We discuss the relation to Shimer and Smith (2000) and other work in Section 6.”
- Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2010, background): “…sorting on exogenous productivity types, where Becker (1973) and the subsequent literature established supermodularity-type conditions that ensure that agents sort monotonically in their types (see, for instance, Shimer and Smith (2000), Legros and Newman (2007), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).”
- The Informational Content of Surnames, the Evolution of Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Matin (2015, background): “Examples of more fully-articulated assignment mechanisms are in Becker (1973), Gavilán (2012), Kremer and Maskin (1995), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Shimer and Smith (2000).”
- High Wage Workers Work for High Wage Firms (2017, methodology): “It is satisfied for any two employment relationships in search models where workers may only search while unemployed, such as Shimer and Smith (2000).”
- Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market (2012, positive): “Following the seminal, theoretical contribution by Shimer and Smith (2000), several empirical contributions (Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2010) introduce randomness into the matching process, to account for the deviations from perfectly assortative matching that characterize…”
- A Distributional Framework for Matched Employer Employee Data (2019, methodology): “This exact offsetting happens in the model of Shimer and Smith (2000) in the absence of on-the-job search, as we discuss in Appendix B.”