Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria
By Ying Chen, Navin Kartik, Joel Sobel. 2008
266 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b12ea09301cdf8528d567a2c5e8e98a1cff6a741
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Daron Acemoglu
- Asuman E. Ozdaglar
- Gary Charness
- Daniel Gottlieb
- Tamer Basar
- Eduardo M. Azevedo
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
- P. Restrepo
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Daron Acemoglu
- Gary Charness
- Asuman E. Ozdaglar
- Emrah Akyol
- Tamer Basar
- Cédric Langbort
- Daniel Gottlieb
- Eduardo M. Azevedo
Citations in the corpus
- Information-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Communication as a Hierarchical Game (2015, background): “, [21] on the selection of the “best” equilibrium among these.”
- Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks (2011, background): “Crawford and Sobel [25], and the literature that follows them, characterizes the amount of information that can be transmitted in such an interaction (see, e.g., [22, 34, 70]).”
- Bare promises: An experiment (2010, background): “6 Complete instructions are available from the authors on request.”
- Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “6According to Chiappori et al. (2006), “As is well known, the mere definition of a competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information is a difficult task, on which it is fair to say that no general agreement has been reached.” See also Myerson (1995). 7We clarify that we study endogenous contract ”