Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
By Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter. Journal of Political Economy, 2011
290 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory’s predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the “surge” began in 2007.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91af105e83163da12c700a2b204a8e09320a9264
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Citations in the corpus
- Winning hearts and minds through development ? evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan (2012, unknown): “Finally, the “hearts and minds” theory (Berman et al, 2009) asserts that the level of violence is, in part, determined by the attitudes of the general population toward the government.”
- Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan† (2015, background): “…Afghanistan), fair elections may also undermine popular support for insurgents by promoting an accountable and legitimate government and by providing a forum for reconciliation ( Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Besley and Persson 2011; McChrystal 2009; United States Army 2006; World Bank 2011 .”
- Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan (2014, unknown): “…war: (1) the amount of aid or development funds allocated to a given village or area (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2011; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011; U.S. Army, 2007), here measured by district-level Commander’s Emergency Response Program, or CERP, spending (top panel) and (2) the…”
- Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones (2013, unknown): “…improving human welfare, but also with helping local governments stabilize insecure or fragile environments (World Bank 2011; Berrebi and Olmstead 2011; US Army 2007).1 Yet theory and evidence are both inconclusive on how development generates stability (Blattman and Miguel 2010, World Bank…”
- Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies (2018, unknown): “34See i.e. Berman et al. (2011a); Miguel et al. (2004).”
- Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict (2010, background): “Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2008)show that increased spending on reconstruction programs was correlated with reductions in violence against coalition forces in Iraq.”
- Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa (2018, unknown): “Western powers use aid to reward allies, punish enemies, build coalitions, and influence public opinion in recipient countries (Morgenthau 1962; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Berman et al. 2011).”