The infant's theory of self-propelled objects.

By D. Premack. 1990

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT CATEGORIZATION IN YOUNG CHILDREN: HIERARCHICAL INCLUSIVENESS, AGE, PERCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTE, AND GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES (2010, background): “Even children with L1 capabilities still have much to figure out, and some conceptual thinking must guide children’s categorization (Mandler, 2000; Premack, 1990).”
The global-to-basic level shift in infants’ categorical thinking: First evidence from a longitudinal study (2002, unknown): “This is based either on dynamic attributes of motion behaviour (Gelman, 1990; Mandler, 1992; Premack, 1990) or on static attributes regarding the appearance of objects (Quinn & Johnson, 2000).”
From Mind Perception to Mental Connection: Synchrony as a Mechanism for Social Understanding (2012, background): “Not surprisingly, perhaps, movement that is self-propelled (Premack, 1990) appears animate.”
How People Explain Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework (1999, unknown): “Desire reasons seem to be easier to infer, as is suggested by research on children’s theory of mind: Preschool children learn to attribute desires before they learn to attribute beliefs (e.g., Lyon, 1993; Nelson-LeGall, 1985; Premack, 1990; Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill & Perner, 1988), and in thei”
How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives. (1992, background): “As Slobin (1985) discussed, linguistic transitivity is among the first notions marked by grammatical morphemes in the acquisition of language.”
Psychological Reasoning in Infancy. (2016, background): “One early hypothesis about how infants identify novel agents involved self-propulsion: perhaps any entity that can move on its own is viewed as agentive (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie, 1994; Premack 1990).”
Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, background): “…of the system-based view generally held that infants are born with a psychological-reasoning system that provides them with a skeletal causal framework for making sense of the actions of agents (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Johnson, 2003; Leslie, 1994b; Premack, 1990).”
AGENCY AND SELF-AWARENESS: ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY (2003, background): “…an infant might be innately disposed to use as markers for intentional behaviour, searchers have identified the properties of being a self-propelled movement, (Premack, 1990), of having an irregular path (Mandler, 1992), and of exerting non rigid transformations on objects (Gibson et al., 1978).”
Whose gaze will infants follow? The elicitation of gaze-following in 12-month-olds (1998, background): “, the presence of eyes, asymmetric body shape, contingent or goal-directed behavior, and self-generated behavior or movement (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Leslie, 1995; Premack, 1990).”
The posterior superior temporal sulcus is sensitive to the outcome of human and non-human goal-directed actions. (2011, background): “In addition, the movement of the robot in Pelphrey et al. (2003) was clearly self-propelled, which is a well-known cue to animacy (Premack, 1990).”
Evidence for knowledge-based category discrimination in infancy. (2002, background): “Mandler and McDonough (1993, 1998) proposed that Pauen 1031 infants may be specifically interested in whether an object is able to perform self-initiated movement (see also Pauen, 2001; Premack, 1990; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995).”
How infants make sense of intentional action (2001, background): “To illustrate, Premack (1990) suggests that having seen”
Infants' use of object parts in early categorization. (1998, background): “Mandler (1992, 1993) and Lakoff (1987) have suggested that infants in the first year of life develop image-schemas representing the movements of objects, among other things, and they use these image-schemas to discriminate between self-instigated motion and caused motion (see also Premack, 1990).”
Behavioral cues to others’ motivation and goal pursuits: The perception of effort facilitates goal inference and contagion (2007, background): “Recently, investigators have started to explore the basic features of movements that cause people to perceive an inanimate object as behaving intentionally or goal-directed (e.g., Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Premack, 1990; Premack & Premack”
Intuitive Theories (2020, background): “…behavior are guided both by bottom-up processes, such as visual cues to animacy and intentional action (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005; Premack, 1990; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006; Tremoulet, Feldman, et al., 2000; Zacks, 2004), as well as top-down processes that are dictated by…”
Domain-specific perceptual causality in children depends on the spatio-temporal configuration, not motion onset (2013, background): “EXPERIMENT 3 Under the standard view, contact or its absence is so important for the domain distinction because this indicates whether the motion is self-initiated, and only agents are capable of this (e.g., Premack, 1990).”
Exploring the use of a mobile robot as an imitation agent with children with low-functioning autism (2008, background): “Premack [29] advances the hypothesis that the perception of intentionality in moving elements is innate to humans.”