The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa

By R. Stone. American Political Science Review, 2004

436 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bec36d3c97fe8b9e0ef9969d3fb13da61b10c96b

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Citations in the corpus

The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, background): “…Africa, which found that France and Britain intervened on behalf of some of their former colonies with which they maintained close political ties; see Stone 2004+ Subsequent interviews at the Fund have confirmed this pattern but underscored that it is limited to Africa+ In other regions, the…”
Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund (2006, background): “…the life of the Fund since the beginning+” 16 Boughton cites several cases of general reviews that were tailored to expedite congressional approval and notes that 13+ Kahler 1990+ 14+ Sandler 2002+ 15+ Stone 2004+ 16+ Pauly 1997, 113+ Financing the International Monetary Fund 371 TABLE 1.”
THE IMF: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF ITS ROLE AND OPERATIONS (2007, neutral): “…of loans rather than their incidence, while Dreher and Jensen (2004) claim that the influence is felt on the nature of structural conditionality.5 Stone (2002, 2004) reports similar political influences over IMF lending to transition economies and African economies and argues that the behaviour…”
The International Monetary Fund: 70 Years of Reinvention (2015, background): “Stone (2004) 10 A country is coded as having “significant and persistent arrears” to official creditors if these arrears (including to the IMF and World Bank) exceed 1% of GDP for three consecutive years or more.”
The human rights effects of world bank structural adjustment, 1981-2000 (2006, background): “Recent work examining IMF selection criteria has argued that countries with policy preferences similar to key Fund contributors were more likely to receive preferential loan conditions (Stone 2004).”
The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? (2013, background): “These include ð1Þ voting patterns at the UN General Assembly ðThacker 1999; Copelovitch 2010; Kilby 2013Þ, ð2Þ bilateral aid provided by the major shareholders ðStone 2002, 2004Þ, ð3Þ major shareholder bank exposure”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “For example, in work on Eastern Europe and Africa, Stone (2002, 2004) shows that the IMF only tends to be fairly consistent and technocratic when initially punishing a country for noncompliance.”
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking (2020, background): “Similarly, Stone (2004, 2008, 2011) argues that major stakeholders selectively intervene in cases relevant to their interests to limit conditionality or its enforcement.”
The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements (2009, background): “…have explored the impact of donor interests on IFIs including the IMF (Andersen et al., 2006b; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Harrigan et al., 2006; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 2005), the World Bank (Andersen et al., 2006a; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Harrigan…”
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation (2009, background): “…Western countries have played a strong leadership role in cultivating the norms of international election monitoring,30 Western organizations, which 23+ Stone 2004, 577+ 24+ See Barnett and Finnemore 2001; and Nielson and Tierney 2003+ 25+ Author’s interview with Betilde Munuz-Pogossian,…”