Monitoring and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments (2015, methodology): “Specifically, we adopt a nearest-neighbor logit propensity score matching strategy, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and used in our context as in Irani and Oesch (2013).”
Are All Analysts Created Equal? Industry Expertise and Monitoring Effectiveness of Financial Analysts (2017, unknown): “12 See, e.g., Fong et al. (2012), Derrien, Kecskes and Mansi (2012), Irani and Oesch (2013), Balakrishnan et al. (2013), Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013), Degeorge et al. (2013), and He and Tian (2013).”
Information Asymmetry, the Cost of Debt, and Credit Events: Evidence from Quasi-Random Analyst Disappearances (2016, background): “Irani and Oesch (2013, 2014) study financial and real earnings management, respectively.”
Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “Prior literature shows that analysts play an important role in corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 2015b).”
Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence (2014, methodology): “To this end, we follow other studies also using brokerage house mergers and financial statement data (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes (2013), Irani and Oesch (2013)) and use a 2-year window consisting of 1 year (365 days) before the merger and 1 year after the merger.”