An Experimental Analysis of Rent Seeking Under Varying Competitive Conditions

By Lisa R. Anderson, Sarah Stafford. 2003

113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd5a3bc4f2ab01be11e07422c382a1f8c31c16f2

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Citations in the corpus

Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests (2009, background): “Anderson and Stafford, 2003).”
Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence (2013, unknown): “…the single-prize contest has been subject to extensive experimental scrutiny (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Tong and Leung, 2002; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Nieken and Sliwka, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010, Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2013; Lim et…”
Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, unknown): “…effect of carryover, risk aversion, multiple prizes, etc (e.g., Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Schmitt et al., 2004; Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011;…”
Endogenous entry in contests (2012, background): “In strictly one-shot games, Anderson and Stafford (2003) find substantial over-dissipation. With two players rent-seeking expenditures are almost twice the predicted level, and for more than two players they find that total rent-seeking expenditures exceed the prize. In contrast, Schmidt, Shupp and ”
The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking (2008, background): “407): “Of these nine papers, six of them show more rent-seeking behavior than the theory predicts (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Schmitt et al., 2004), while one shows no significant differences between theoretical predictio”
Endowment Effects in Contests (2009, unknown): “(1998), Anderson and Stafford (2003), Morgan et al. (forthcoming), and Sheremeta and Zhang (2010). Under the P protocol, each subject receives a small per-period endowment which can be used to make bids in that period of the experiment.”
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “1998; Anderson and Stafford 2003; Sheremeta 2010a, b, 2011a; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010; Savikhin and Sheremeta 2013; Morgan et al. 2012) have replicated (i) overbidding (whichwe also refer to as over-expenditure of effort) and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Figure 2 dis”
Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “These predictions are also supported by laboratory experiments (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Kimbrough et al., 2011).”