FPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection

By Jorge Guajardo, Sandeep S. Kumar, Geert Jan Schrijen, Pim Tuyls. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2007

1,274 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hardware and Architecture

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bacf21343fa323ca220cc70e1ec06e782ecbe2e2

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Citations in the corpus

Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions (2010, methodology): “SRAM PUFs were proposed in [14] and a very similar concept was simultaneously presented in [21].”
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions (2010, methodology): “We stress that purely numerical modeling attacks, as presented in this paper, are not relevant for Weak PUFs with just one challenge (such as the Coating PUF, SRAM PUF, or Butter.y PUF).”
A PUF taxonomy (2019, methodology): “20 An SRAM PUF [6] uniquely characterises a system through the variation of otherwise symmetric transistor branches within static random access memory (SRAM) elements, as a result of the variation in the manufacture process.”
PUFKY: A Fully Functional PUF-Based Cryptographic Key Generator (2012, background): “[4, 10, 14], the additional entropy loss by the strong extractor is ignored and the resulting keys can not be considered information-theoretically secure.”
Physically Unclonable Functions (2012, methodology): “[50] and redefine both notions in terms of a security game with an adversary.”
PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data (2013, background): “Unfortunately, it can be difficult to uphold this requirement in practice.”
Extended abstract: The butterfly PUF protecting IP on every FPGA (2008, background): “6% noise level assuming pre-processing during the enrollment stage [7].”
Improved Ring Oscillator PUF: An FPGA-friendly Secure Primitive (2011, methodology): “Nowadays, most of the FPGA manufacturers reset the start-up state of the SRAM cells to a known value rendering the SRAM-PUF [5] difficult to be used.”
Physical unclonable functions (2020, methodology): “In 2007, the first intrinsic PUF was introduced: an SRAM PUF 20 .”
Lightweight secure PUFs (2008, positive): “Statistical analysis of the new structure and its comparison with existing PUFs indicates a signi.cantly lower predictability, and higher resilience against circuit faults, reverse engineering and other security attacks.”
A Systematic Method to Evaluate and Compare the Performance of Physical Unclonable Functions (2011, methodology): “For example, in an SRAM PUF, the SRAM cell that produces a response i has an on-chip location that is different from that of another SRAM cell that produces a response j.”
Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers (2009, positive): “Closely related to the FERNS method presented in this paper is a PUF design for FPGAs that uses a derivative of power-up SRAM state as a secret key to an algorithmic oneway hash function [24], [25].”
Efficient Helper Data Key Extractor on FPGAs (2008, methodology): “In [5], the authors further reduce the computation and communication complexity of the protocols in [8] and introduce the idea of Intrinsic-PUFs based on the start-up values of SRAM memory values.”