Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers

By Daniel E. Holcomb, Wayne P. Burleson, Kevin Fu. IEEE transactions on computers, 2009

828 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and Metrics (2014, background): “Another possibility is to use fingerprints derived from the static random access memory cells in the IC [38].”
Physical Unclonable Functions and Applications: A Tutorial (2014, background): “An attacker with access to the power channel could potentially control the stability of some of the SRAM PUF bits through this mechanism [12].”
Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain (2014, background): “Other types of PUF implementation include SRAM PUFs [94], butterfly PUFs [64], and bistable ring PUFs [95], [96].”
Physically Unclonable Functions (2012, neutral): “[57, 58] study the SRAM power-up behavior on two different platforms: a commercial of-the shelf SRAM chip and embedded SRAM in a microcontroller chip.”
A large scale characterization of RO-PUF (2010, background): “In general, correlated or systematic process variation may lead to non-uniform PUF response if not taken care of [3,4].”
Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions (2010, background): “In [21, 22], the SRAM power-up behavior on two different platforms was studied.”
Physical unclonable functions (2020, background): “First, noisy responses are a good random source for building a TRNG 24,124–126 that is a critical part of cryptographic primitives and security protocols.”