The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness

By Harvey S. James. 2002

304 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ba5fa47015c9eb2a763a84a312351b2091d05bc8

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Citations in the corpus

A Survey on Trust Modeling (2015, background): “Economics Expectation upon a risky action under uncertainty and ignorance based on the calculated incentives for the action James [2002]”
Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance (2018, unknown): “In particular, trust is an action taken by a party in an economic transaction with the anticipation that the other party in the transaction will not exploit the vulnerability that the party has created for herself by taking an action with an uncertain outcome (James 2002; Bohnet et al. 2008).”
How shall I trust the faceless and the intangible? A literature review on the antecedents of online trust (2010, background): “Though both exchanges conceptually differ (Emerson, 1987), both also depend on trust for their continuation and completion (Buskens, 1998; Doney et al., 1998; James, 2002), just as both exchanges involved varying amounts of uncertainty and risks (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000).”
A Survey on Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (2011, background): “We examine the literature to study how trust is defined in various disciplines including sociology, economics, philosophy, psychology, organizational management, and autonomic computing in industrial and system engineering.”
Cooperative strategies in customer–supplier relationships: The role of interfirm trust (2009, background): “Since there is always the possibility for the partner organisation to honour or exploit the trust of the other firm (James, 2002), the trusting firm sets itself vulnerable to the possible opportunistic behaviour of the partner.”
The Psychology (and Economics) of Trust (2009, background): “However, Player A tends to send more money in the first case. Player A’s investing is motivated in large part by an expectation that Player B will return money (in other words, trust), instead of a benevolent concern for Player B’s well-being. Cox (2004) argues that the decisions of both the sender ”