The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm Value

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Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors (2006, unknown): “As in Fich and Shivdasani (2003), we find that firm size is positively associated with market-to-book ratios.”
Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns (2006, background): “The IRRC database’s governance index counts the number of takeover defenses and other anti-shareholder provisions in a firm’s charter and bylaws, following Gompers et al. (2003) who find that this index has negative associations with a company’s stock market performance. I tabulate data for aircraft”
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “…for a compensationrelated shareholder proposal or 20% objection to a compensation-related 20 See, for example, Acharya and Volpin (2010), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Weisbach (1988), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2005, 2006), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008a,b).”
Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt (2008, unknown): “Recent evidence suggests that EBC helps align incentives of outside directors and shareholders (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005; Bryan et al., 2000).”
Corporate Governance and Risk Taking: Evidence from the U.K. and German Insurance Markets (2014, unknown): “In addition, shareholders’ and directors’ interests may be aligned through accordingly structured compensation plans, as shown by Fich and Shivdasani (2005).”