Hardnose the Dictator

By Todd L. Cherry, Peter Frykblom, Jason F. Shogren. 2002

954 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b8741f8131899af8a81c062ca668112ec62323f5

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Citations in the corpus

Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men? Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator Games (2012, methodology): “In contrast to most standard dictator games (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1986), Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Dana et al. (2006)), Cherry et al. (2002) report that 95% of their dictators behaved in line with the standard neoclassical prediction of sel sh maximization of their own monetary income.1 Our…”
Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games (2008, background): “In Cherry et al. (2002), dictators (not receivers) earned wealth via a 17 question exam.”
Attitudes to Income Inequality: Experimental and Survey Evidence (2014, background): “Similar results are found in Cherry et al. (2002) when the asset of the dictators in the bargaining game is legitimate.”
More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, neutral): “…allocator participants are often guided by own intrinsic fairness concerns (Forsythe et al., 1994), but that dictator giving depends on the details of the interaction (Cherry et al., 2002) It is important to note that many of the dictator game experiments depart quite a bit from the ultimatum game.”
Just luck: an experimental study of risk taking and fairness (2013, background): “…Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Konow, Saijo, and Akai 2009; Konow 2000, 2009 and stakeholder behavior ( Cappelen et al. 2007; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki 2004 , but this is the first…”
Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral (2009, background): “There is evidence from related settings that such changes in how subjects receive their initial endowment can significantly change behaviour: see Cherry et al. (2002) , Johnson et al. (2006) and George et al. (2007).”
Responsibility for what? Fairness and individual responsibility (2010, background): “Specifically, we assume that person i is maximizing the following utility function when proposing a 1 For other studies of real-effort dictator games, see Cappelen et al. (2007), Cherry et al. (2002), Frohlich et al. (2004), Konow (2000), and Konow et al. (2009).”
Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, neutral): “It is an increasing concern in laboratory experiments that behavior can differ according to whether one has to decide on the allocation of either windfall or earned wealth (also called endowment effect, see, among others, Rutström, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002).”
I'm Moral, but I Won't Help You: The Distinct Roles of Empathy and Justice in Donations (2014, methodology): “We recognize that prior research has found people to be less willing to give earned versus unearned money (i.e., the windfall effect; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002), but we likely did not obtain such an effect from the bonus money on donation allocation (i.e., a windfall effect) for one of two…”
Luck, Choice and Responsibility (2014, neutral): “5 Previous research on social and distributive preferences has studied the behavior of both stakeholders (Cappelen et al., 2007; Cherry et al., 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frohlich et al., 2004) and disinterested spectators (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Stro”
Paradigmatic Experiments: the Dictator Game (2010, methodology): “Mittone and Ploner (2008) use an environment that is identical to the Cherry et al. (2002) design, except that the recipients are asked to exert the same effort as the dictators (by answering a quiz) while not being rewarded by the experimenter (i.e. the recipients’ effort does not contribute to…”