Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

By C. Conover. 2004

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An institution-based view of executive compensation: A multilevel meta-analytic test (2012, background): “Although such firm-level moderators are clearly important in explaining the performance sensitivity of executive pay, several scholars have observed that the field has nearly exhausted their explanatory potential (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).”
The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, methodology): “20 We use Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) Entrenchment Index to account for the use of antitakeover devices, and expect the sign on the index to be positive in the regressions.”
When Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change (2016, background): “In corporate law, uk and collaborators have shown how the main limit on rent extraction on rt of company executives is “public outrage,” which is intermittent and often t (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002).”