Gender differences in the ultimatum game

By S. Solnick. 2001

418 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b69be608d4df8876bdade7acb88e3205b4c3d17e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Cary A. Deck
2. Matthias Sutter
3. Martin G. Kocher
4. Charles Bellemare
5. Sabine Kröger
6. Ananish Chaudhuri
7. Rachel T. A. Croson
8. A. Soest

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Matthias Sutter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Cary A. Deck
4. Frans van Winden
5. A. Soest
6. Barbara Petrongolo
7. James C. Cox
8. Mara Olekalns

In Safety Research

1. Matthias Sutter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Cary A. Deck
4. Ananish Chaudhuri
5. Simon Gächter
6. Ernst Fehr
7. Charles Bellemare
8. Sabine Kröger

Citations in the corpus

• The Moral Psychology Handbook (2010, background): “However, in an economic game called ‘‘the dictator game,’’ both males and females are disposed to reject low offers (Solnick, 2001), suggesting that both get upset when windfall gains are shared unequally.”
• Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex! (2009, methodology): “Eckel and Grossman (2008) discuss other possible sources for the different results between Eckel and Grossman (2001) and Solnick (2001) at greater length.”
• Empathy: Gender effects in brain and behavior (2014, background): “In Eckel and Grossman (2001) the participants had face-to-face interactions while in Solnick (2001) they did not see each other, and greater strategic thinking might have been invoked when participants were asked to indicate their minimum acceptable offer.”
• Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination (2018, neutral): “5.4 Discrimination in Bargaining Experiments There is experimental research on sex differences in bargaining outcomes (e.g., Eckel 2008; Solnick 2001), which of course could influence pay.”
• Gender Differences in Preferences (2009, background): “In ultimatum games, women’s accept–reject decisions vary more with the gender of their partner than do men’s (Eckel and Grossman 2001; Solnick 2001).”
• MEASURING INEQUITY AVERSION IN A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION USING EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES (2008, result): “This is in line with evidence from ultimatum games (e.g., Solnick, 2001) and dictator games (e.g., Bolten and Katok, 1995, and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) using student subjects who did not know the gender of the other players.17 We found significant evidence of non-linear aversion to inequity…”
• Negotiating the Gender Divide (2012, background): “These accommodating behaviors invite exploitation: Believing that women will accept less than men, negotiation opponents routinely make lower opening offers to women (Glick & Croson, 2001; Solnick, 2001).”
• More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, neutral): “…age, gender, income and education effects are often inconclusive (recent contributions are, for instance, Saad and Gill, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2005; Garcia-Gallego et al., 2012), especially if one takes a look at the overall picture over the last 30 years.”
• Social value orientation moderates the effects of intuition versus reflection on responses to unfair ultimatum offers (2017, neutral): “…anthropological (e.g., evolution, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; cultural variations, Henrich et al., 2001), sociological (e.g., gender differences, Solnick, 2001; social distance effects, Charness & Gneezy, 2008), and individual (e.g., relations to personality, Brandstätter & Königstein, 2001;…”
• GENDER STEREOTYPES AND NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE: AN EXAMINATION OF THEORY AND RESEARCH (2004, background): “In studies involving distributive negotiations, PDGs, and ultimatum tasks, male negotiators appear to receive more favorable offers than female negotiators (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Nadler & Nadler, 1985; Smith, Vernon & Tarte, 1975; Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999).”
• Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis (2008, background): “28 Swamy et al. (2001) present some results disaggregated to the country level.”
• Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity (2003, background): “See also the papers by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Croson and Buchan (1999), Eckel and Grossman (1996, 1998, 2000b), Scharlemann et al (2001) and Solnick (2000) for evidence of gender differences in a variety of economic transactions.”