Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

By Matthias Sutter, Ronald Bosman, Martin G. Kocher, Frans van Winden. 2009

177 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a9cb51f733284941bca2172b61b9427b66d4a10c

How researchers see this paper

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In Safety Research

1. Mara Olekalns
2. Carol T. Kulik

Citations in the corpus

• GENDER MATCHING AND COMPETITIVENESS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (2013, unknown): “The relevance of other participants’ gender for economic decisions has been documented in other situations, such as bargaining (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Sutter et al., 2009), in prisoner’s dilemma games (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), and in coordination games (Holm, 2000).”
• More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, unknown): “…(for instance we did not discuss the powerto-take game experiments; see Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al. 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2009; Reuben and van Winden, 2010; or stronger deviations from the standard setup such as the ultimatum reciprocity measure in…”
• Negotiating the Gender Divide (2012, background): “Women’s reluctance to pursue a failing female–female negotiation may reflect their awareness that greater social costs are incurred in negotiations with other women (Olekalns, Kulik, Simonov, & Bradshaw, 2011; Sutter et al., 2009).”