Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Zeuthen Lectures)

By Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini. 2000

3,288 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies (2007, background): “The main model discussed above is Model 1 in Table 1, which reports the coefficients and standard errors of the variables+ The short-term effects are the coefficients on the change variables while the long-term effects can be calculated by dividing the coefficients on the level variables by the lagg”
Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm. Performance: Evidence from Latin America (2002, unknown): “Ades and Di Tella, 1999; De Soto, 1990; Diamond and Plattner, 1993; Friedman et al. 2000; Henisz, 2000; IADB, 2000; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Mauro, 1995, 1998; Persoon and Tabellini, 2000; Rodrik, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Tanzi, 1995; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000; L”
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules (2002, background): “congressional politics (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) and to the study of distributive politics and government institutions in general.”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, methodology): “Efthyvoulou (2010) presents the simplified two-period electoral model with seignorage developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000) , and deals with an extension of this model that allows the re-election-to-competence sensitivity to depend on the levels of non-economic voting and electoral competitiven”
Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix (2012, result): “This is in contrast to most Downsian models (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Roberts 1977 ;R omer1975; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Persson and Tabellini 2000 ) that predict greater redistribution in more unequal societies.”
Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries (2013, result): “Similar results are obtained by Persson and Tabellini (2000) ,”
Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's “Age of Reform” (2004, methodology): “3 The question of peaceful expansions of the franchise has recently been revived by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, and 2003), and Conley and Temimi (2001).”
Self-Enforcing Democracy (2006, background): “I argue that the institution of regular elections solves a coordination problem posed by imper- 2For norms or culture-based accounts, see in particular Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset (1963).”
Better Rules or Stronger Communities? On the Social Foundations of Institutional Change and Its Economic Effects (2006, background): “…of effort by potentially productive actors; formally, it amounts to a capital market imperfection (Aghion 1998).8 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) argued theoretically that less inequality has a positive relationship to growth, which is consistent with the empirical…”
Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from a New Dataset (2010, unknown): “24 The idea underlying this instrument is based on Persson and Tabellini (2009), who use democracy in neighboring countries as a proxy for democratic capital.”