Self-Enforcing Democracy

By J. Fearon. 2006

444 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b1acee9ba50610f869e2f153bd6be903dc09aef

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Citations in the corpus

Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement* (2019, background): “, Fischbacher et al., 2001). Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) propose a model in which moderates update their beliefs about the gains from protest negatively if they believe other agents’ thresholds for turnout are too low. This makes moderates select out of protesting when they update their beliefs po”
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution (2012, background): “That is, in Fearon (2011) elections provide information about actions taken by the incumbent, while in this model they provide information about the state of the world. in addition to their private information.”
Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives (2009, background): “Przeworski (2006) estimates that the frequency of a democracy failing each year in a country with a per capita income of less than $1000 per year is 0.085 or one in twelve (see Table 2); with a per capita income of $3001–6055, it is 0.016 or one in sixty-one; while no democracy with a per capita…”
The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring (2017, background): “, Aidt and Jensen 2013; Aidt and Franck 2013), and some others have modeled the decision to take part in protests and the implications of these endogenous protests on political equilibria (e.g., Kuran 1989, 1991; Lohmann 1994; Fearon 2011; Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2010; Bidner and Francois 2013”
Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China (2014, unknown): “3 Fearon 2011; Kuran 1991a, 1991b. 4 Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2011.”
Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud (2016, background): “…that, if she engages in fraud, she will obtain the promised reward only if the incumbent is re-elected and may face prosecution if the incumbent is ultimately defeated.8 benefited significantly from fraud conducted on his behalf in the state of Illinois during the 1960 presidential election.”
Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes (2015, background): “ary collective action (Fearon, 2011) or on the interplay between incumbents and challengers (Cox, 2009).”
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence (2012, background): “Pre-Election Violence increases the probability of Post-Election Protest by over 0.20.”
A theory of informational autocracy (2020, background): “Fearon (2011) models how, in democracy, the threat of revolt disciplines leaders, and how regularly scheduled elections can serve as a device to coordinate that revolt.”