Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's “Age of Reform”
By Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico. 2004
765 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7e100609edc84c5516a540215a83396d010cd6d0
How researchers see this paper
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In Demography
- Toke S. Aidt
- Peter Sandholt Jensen
- Oded Galor
- James A. Robinson
- Daron Acemoglu
- Francesc Ortega
- Graziella Bertocchi
- Suresh Naidu
In Economics and Econometrics
- Daron Acemoglu
- Oded Galor
- Toke S. Aidt
- P. Restrepo
- Peter Sandholt Jensen
- Omer Moav
- James A. Robinson
- Dietrich Vollrath
Citations in the corpus
- Response to David J. Samuels and Ben W. Ansell’s review of From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy (2014, background): “Political economists agree - witness the well-known efforts seeking to explain why most government spending tends to favor the wealthy (e.g. Benabou 1996, 2000; Benabou and Ok 2001; Grossman and Helpman 2002; Justman and Gradstein 1999; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Ross 2006; Stigler 1970).”
- Das Human Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure (2004, background): “Mutually beneficial reforms are also considered by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).”
- Immigration quotas and skill upgrading (2005, background): “Important contributions in this 1 The figures are reported by Schmidley (2001), based on CPS data. literature are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Jack and Lagunoff (2003).”
- International migration and the role of institutions (2008, background): “by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) , respectively.”
- Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938 (2009, background): “Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Boix (2003, chapter 1), Lizzeri and Persico (2004) develop alternative theories of franchise extension.”
- Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938 (2006, background): “…different channels through which these changes in restrictions on political participation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Boix, 2001) and in the election rule (Austen-Smith, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapters 8 and 9; Lizzeri and…”
- Internet and Politics: Evidence from U.K. Local Elections and Local Government Policies (2015, background): “(Lott, 1999; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004), and transfers from the federal governments are higher in U.”
- Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances (2013, neutral): “…of electoral and institutional controls on politicians (e.g. La Ferrara and Bates, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Padro-i-Miquel, 2007; Robinson and Verdier, 2013) and to models of elite capture of democratic politics, for example,…”
- Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence (2009, background): “22See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Ghosal and Proto (2005) as well.”