Anonymous Web transactions with Crowds

By Michael K. Reiter, Aviel D. Rubin. 1999

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Citations in the corpus

Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems (2001, background): “Crowds ([26]) consists of a number of network nodes that are run by the users of the system.”
A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Security Issues (2002, background): “Many such systems, including onion routing [25], Crowds [18], Publius [26], and Tangler [27], fundamentally assume a relatively small number of nodes in the network, all wellknown to each other.”
Dissent: accountable anonymous group messaging (2010, background): “Crowds [29] are more computationally efficient than mix-networks, but are vulnerable to statistical traffic analy-”
Virtual Customer Service Agents: Using Social Presence and Personalization to Shape Online Service Encounters (2014, methodology): “Research has identified that the design of information systems influences the extent to which an IT artifact conveys feelings of sociable and sensitive human contact.”
Dining Cryptographers Revisited (2004, background): “In many real-world cases, however, this is not necessarily a serious drawback, as in the Crowds system [19], where participants provide mutual protection of privacy.”
Engineering Privacy (2009, background): “Naturally, anonymous transactions imply a higher degree of privacy for the data provider [82], [83].”
Addressing privacy requirements in system design: the PriS method (2008, background): “It is based on the idea that people can be anonymous when they blend into the crowd [30, 31].”
Eclipse Attacks on Overlay Networks: Threats and Defenses (2006, background): “Although there are many general-purpose anonymous channel mechanisms for overlay networks [13], [17], [27], [32], [45], the anonymity requirements of our auditing mechanism are weaker than those”
Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems (2000, background): “Rubin and Reiter propose an lighter weight alternative to mixes and dc-nets in [37, 38].”
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms (2001, background): “For example, anonymizing intermediaries such as remailers and proxy servers can exchange messages between parties without revealing either one’s identity to the other (Goldschlag et al., 1999; Reiter and Rubin, 1999).”
Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000, methodology): “The closest work to our own is Reiter and Rubin's Crowds systemm21], which uses a similar method of proxying requests for consumers, although Crowds does not itself store information and does not protect information producers.”