The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
By Eric J. Friedman, Paul Resnick. 2001
754 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e499685036db797c6694509d2d6a2eaf8b52ed4c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Axel Ockenfels
- Chrysanthos Dellarocas
- Gary E. Bolton
- Angelika Dimoka
- Sonja Buchegger
- J. L. Boudec
- Paul A. Pavlou
- Roslan Ismail
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Paul A. Pavlou
- John Riedl
- J. L. Boudec
- Sonja Buchegger
- Chrysanthos Dellarocas
- Audun Jøsang
- Roslan Ismail
- John Chung-I Chuang
In Safety Research
- Elena Katok
- Richard J. Zeckhauser
- Axel Ockenfels
- Gary E. Bolton
- Angelika Dimoka
- Paul A. Pavlou
- Chrysanthos Dellarocas
- Hector Garcia-Molina
Citations in the corpus
- Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard (2005, background): “Friedman and Resnick (2001) refer to this property as “cheap pseudonyms.”
- Cooperative peer groups in NICE (2003, background): “This property makes NICE applications robust against a number of cheap identity based denial-of-service attacks that are possible on other p2p systems[ 10 ].”
- How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols (2014, background): “It has been claimed that reputations systems find limited applicability because it is unclear how to define the reputation of new users (especially since users can pick new names whenever they want)[41].”
- Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior (2000, background): “It is interesting to observe that, while, in most cases, the anonymity of online communities has been viewed as a source of additional risks [2, 4], here we have an example of a situation where anonymity can be used to eliminate some transaction risks.”
- A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision (2007, background): “However, this practice is not i the general interest of the community [20] and should be prevented or discouraged .”
- A survey of attack and defense techniques for reputation systems (2009, background): “The attack is facilitated by the availability of cheap pseudonyms and the fact that reciprocity is much harder to maintain with easily changed identifiers [46].”
- The Nature and Role of Feedback Text Comments in Online Marketplaces: Implications for Trust Building, Price Premiums, and Seller Differentiation (2006, methodology): “Following Pavlou and Gefen (2005), the study’s research method integrated secondary auction data from eBay with primary data from eBay’s buyers.”
- Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing P2P reputation systems (2006, methodology): “The CA or login server may require real-world identity proof to ensure that each user receives only one system identifier, perhaps using credit card verification [28,18].”
- How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation (2004, positive): “market platforms should try to gain control over the agents’ identities (see Friedman and Resnick, 2001, for more theoretical reasons along these lines and how control can be realized).(29) As we alluded in the Introduction, Granovetter (1985) argues that people have greater confidence in informatio”
- Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research (2001, background): “However, the lack of face-to-face communication and the availability of free pseudonyms may hamper the ability of a community to regulate its members [157].”