Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

By Jayson L. Lusk, Jason F. Shogren. 2007

464 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b0d6a31b979c0c34a35ce4f14023e7e1777bfb95

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. R. Vecchio
2. N. Jacquemet
3. Jason F. Shogren
4. Stéphane Luchini
5. R. Nayga
6. Robert-Vincent Joule

In Marketing

1. R. Vecchio
2. R. Nayga
3. M. Borrello
4. Andrés Silva
5. D. Thilmany
6. John L. Park
7. A. Lombardi
8. Maurizio Canavari

In Safety Research

1. R. Vecchio
2. H. Groote
3. Jason F. Shogren
4. R. Nayga
5. Jackson Loomis
6. Wuyang Hu
7. J. Penn

Citations in the corpus

• Willingness to pay for insect-based food: The role of information and carrier (2019, background): “Price feedback was not provided between rounds, as it might introduce affiliation effects (Lusk & Shogren, 2007).”
• Estimating consumer willingness to pay for food quality with experimental auctions: the case of yellow versus fortified maize meal in Kenya: H. De Groote et al. / Agricultural Economics xx (2010) 1-16 (2010, background): “The question of bidding in different experimental auction types has been discussed widely in the literature (see Lusk and Shogren, 2007, for a recent overview). Differences in bidding have been reported even across incentive-compatible auctions, in which fully optimizing participants would be expect”
• Determinants of willingness-to-pay for sustainable wine: Evidence from experimental auctions (2013, methodology): “In order to determine which estimation method was most appropriate between Tobit and double hurdle, we followed Lusk and Shogren (2007) and calculated a likelihood ratio statistic.”
• Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, background): “Ideally, preference elicitation should be more accurate if bidders have no misconceptions about the operations and procedures of the auction mechanism (see for example Lusk and Shogren, 2007; Shogren et al., 1994).”
• Revisiting Cheap Talk with New Evidence from a Field Experiment (2011, background): “For instance, Lusk and Shogren (2007) identified 113 academic publications that used experimental auctions.”
• Consumer stated preferences for dairy products with carbon footprint labels in Italy (2020, background): “…on one side, rely upon a larger and nation-wide representative sample to avoid the problems linked to self-selected and biased samples; on the other side, it should focus on non-hypothetical techniques, such as experimental auctions to obtain reliable estimations of WTP (Lusk and Shogren 2007).”
• Consumer Preferences for Fruit and Vegetables with Credence-Based Attributes: A Review (2011, background): “While experience and search good involves usually private good characteristics, credence good provides private benefits to those who consume the good, while its production often has " affiliated public dimensions " (Lusk et al. 2007).”
• Developing country consumers’ acceptance of biofortified foods: a synthesis (2015, unknown): “There are several such mechanisms: for example, in an n price auction, participants simultaneously submit sealed bids for the product(s) and the n-1 highest bidders pay the n highest bid as the price for the product (Lusk and Shogren 2007).”