Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programmes: evidence from Eritrea
By N. Hermes, Robert Lensink, Habteab Mehrteab Teki. 2003
162 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b04c7980d745a02aa6f974ca2e1da130d3b0b1c6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Christian Ahlin
- Mobin Fatma
- Imran Khan
- Izaskun Agirre Aramburu
- Zillur Rahman
- Irune Gómez Pescador
- Robert M. Townsend
- Susanna Khavul
In Economics and Econometrics
- Susanna Khavul
- Christian Ahlin
- Mobin Fatma
- Imran Khan
- Izaskun Agirre Aramburu
- Zillur Rahman
- Irune Gómez Pescador
- Robert M. Townsend
In Management Information Systems
Citations in the corpus
- Microfinance: Creating Opportunities for the Poor? (2010, background): “Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab (2005) found that group leaders in Eritrean microfinancing groups mattered more in overcoming the moral hazard problem than other group members.”
- The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on Customer Loyalty: The Mediating Effect of Reputation in Cooperative Banks Versus Commercial Banks in the Basque Country (2017, background): “2009) and implementing CSR at a practical level with initiatives such as financial inclusion (Decker 2004), microcredit schemes for the deprived (Hermes et al. 2005) and socially responsible banking (Scholtens 2009).”
- Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending (2007, background): “26 Hermes et al. (2005) find evidence that stronger monitoring by the group leader, but not by group members, mitigates moral hazard.”
- Multi-Item Stakeholder Based Scale to Measure CSR in the Banking Industry (2014, methodology): “…et al., 2009; Marin and Ruiz, 2009) by implementing CSR into practices with initiatives such as financial inclusion (Decker, 2004), microcredit schemes for the deprived (Hermes et al., 2005), socially responsible banking (Scholtens, 2009) and credit access to the poor (Prior and Argandona, 2008).”
- THE EMPIRICS OF MICROFINANCE: WHAT DO WE KNOW? (2007, unknown): “Hermes et al. (2005) elaborate on this last result and investigate the role of the group leader in reducing moral hazard behaviour, using data of 102 groups from two Eritrean group lending programmes.”