Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability

By Derek A. Neal, D. Schanzenbach. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007

532 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afd94456a602a3aa1a2832aac59bc4fc50b7ca62

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In Education

Citations in the corpus

Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston’s Charter High Schools on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice (2016, unknown): “A growing literature suggests that educators respond strategically to the incentive to boost test scores ð Neal and Schanzenbach 2010 Þ .”
Assessing the Effect of School Days and Absences on Test Score Performance. CEP Discussion Paper No. 1302. (2014, unknown): “This is consistent with the findings of Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) who show that NCLB is likely to increase scores for marginal students.”
Estimating the Effects of No Child Left Behind on Teachers’ Work Environments and Job Attitudes (2014, unknown): “Studies of NCLB have focused primarily on the impact of the reform on test scores (Ballou & Springer, 2011; Dee & Jacob, 2011; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) and on organizational responses by districts and schools (CEP, 2006; Dee et al., 2013; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2007).”
Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education (2011, unknown): “In a study that analyzed test scores before and after the introduction of Chicago’s own accountability program in 1996, and before and after the introduction of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act requirements in 2002 (Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010), the greatest gains were shown by students in the mi”
Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania* (2018, unknown): “It may encourage teachers to focus on students close to the passing threshold, neglecting students who are far below or far above the threshold (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010).”
The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Student Achievement. (2011, unknown): “For example, Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) present evidence that, following the introduction of NCLB in Illinois, the performance of Chicago school students near the proficiency threshold (i.e., those in the middle of the distribution) improved while the performance of those at the bottom of the…”
Cream Skimming, Parking, and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of High-Powered, Performance-Based Contracts (2013, unknown): “And in their study of public school accountability systems in Chicago, Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) similarly concluded that a focus on proficiency standards left out students performing both far below and far above the standard.”
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems (2010, background): “36 For example, in education systems with performance assessments based on specific standards for proficiency, we are more likely to observe a reallocation of effort to “bubble kids,” those on the cusp of reaching the standard (Pedulla et al., 2003; Koretz & Hamilton, 2006). Figlio and Rouse (2005) ”
Educational triage and ability-grouping in primary mathematics: a case-study of the impacts on low-attaining pupils (2014, unknown): “…of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, where schools have been found to divert resources towards ‘bubble kids’ – those students near proficiency levels – whilst giving no additional attention to students deemed unlikely to reach proficiency levels (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010).”
Test Anxiety and High-Stakes Test Performance Between School Settings: Implications for Educators (2012, unknown): “The availability of resources influence how schools respond to accountability sanctions (Diamond & Spillane, 2004; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2007).”