Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments
By Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Daniel Houser, Kevin Mccabe, Holly Ameden. 2007
287 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afa0723c97704a3b1e12acc7c166f0fe5c607801
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Alexander Vostroknutov
- Simon Gächter
- Christian Thöni
- Erik O. Kimbrough
- Dietmar Fehr
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Ernst Fehr
In Safety Research
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- Christian Thöni
- Erik O. Kimbrough
- Alexander Vostroknutov
- G. Fellner
- Dietmar Fehr
- Giorgio Coricelli
Citations in the corpus
- Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2004, background): “In order to address this conjecture, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2001) sorted par- ticipants in a public good experiment according to their initial contribution into high, middle and low contributors.”
- Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment (2005, unknown): “in a Public Goods Experiment”
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Like Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007), Ones and Putterman (2007) find that early contributions can serve as a significant predictor of contributions in later periods.”
- Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency (2005, unknown): “Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) 1 , Burlando and Guala (2005), and Ones and Putterman (forthcoming) found evidence of subject heterogeneity and its persistence by having the experimenter sort subjects into groups. Their studies used exogenous regrouping to identify and study the persistence of heterog”
- Social learning and voluntary cooperation among like-minded people (2005, background): “Hypothesis 4: The average contribution of LOW cooperator groups is the same as in the Sorted N experiment.”
- NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “For example, Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe (2007) regroup subjects in public goods games according to their initial contributions and find that assortative matching supports cooperation over time.”
- Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, unknown): “This result has been confirmed by several previ- 2 ous experiments where, without subjects’ knowledge, groups are formed exogenously based on previous contribution behavior (Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe, 2007; Ones and Putterman, 2007).”