Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia

By Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang. 2000

308 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aef01a6097733083232c15640feb8aab30f00afc

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Citations in the corpus

Two Faces: Effects of Business Groups on Innovation in Emerging Economies (2004, background): “…such as internal capital markets in weak external capital markets (Teece 1996), business reputations and government ties that attract foreign technology providers (Hobday 1995), and concentrated ownership that provides long-term perspectives on R&D investments (Claessens et al. 2000).”
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand (2001, methodology): “The results are similar to Claessens et al. (2000a), Lins (2000) and Yeh and Lee (2000). Claessens et al. (2000a) use data on nine East Asian countries.”
Family Control and the Rent–Seeking Society (2003, unknown): “In addition, Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2001), and others document systematic abuse of public shareholders by controlling families of corporate groups across a wide range of East Asian and European countries.11 These families may merely prefer weak financial systems because stronger…”
Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia (2005, unknown): “The group affiliation information is from Claessens et al. (2000b), which includes 170 large corporate groups across the eight economies.”
Investor Protection and Equity Markets (2002, unknown): “Part a) is consistent with previous empirical literature, such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000).”
Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia (2002, unknown): “Various country sources on business group affiliation as detailed in Claessens et al. (2000) are employed to study the pyramid structures and cross-holdings among group-affiliated firms.”
Law and Firms' Access to Finance (2004, unknown): “…institutions influence the efficiency with which financial systems allocate capital (Wurgler 2000; Beck and Levine 2002), the valuation of firms (Claessens et al. 2002; LLSV 2002; Caprio et al. 2003), the dividend payment policies of corporations (LLSV 2000), the efficiency of equity markets…”
Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis (2004, background): “Claessens et al. (1999), Lemmon and Lins (2001), Mitton (2002), and LLSV (2002) find that firm value is negatively related to the separation of the cash flow and control rights of the controlling shareholders.”
The Relationship Between Valuation and Ownership of Listed Firms in China (2003, unknown): “Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest it is firm characteristics, that is the potential to derive private benefits of control, which motivates investors in this respect.”