Investor Protection and Equity Markets

By A. Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenzon. 2002

1,127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/281d46d31b375fffc3bd299ff29f523d19539aa3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Christian Leuz
2. René M. Stulz
3. Peter D. Wysocki
4. Omrane Guedhami
5. G. Karolyi
6. Heitor Almeida
7. T. Wong
8. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

In Finance

1. Christian Leuz
2. Peter D. Wysocki
3. René M. Stulz
4. Luc Laeven
5. G. Karolyi
6. José-Luis Peydró
7. Heitor Almeida
8. Thorsten Beck

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, neutral): “Arguing along these lines, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) stress that the misappropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders raises costs of capital to the whole corporate sector and thus impedes growth.”
• Corporate Governance and Risk Taking (2008, neutral): “One strand of the literature is focused on the effect of investor protection on the cost of capital (e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Lombardo and Pagano (2002), and Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004)).”
• Corporate Governance and the Home Bias (2003, background): “As discussed earlier, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) predict that ownership is more concentrated when investor protection is weaker.”
• Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies (2013, background): “sake of private benefits ( Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002 ).”
• Rethinking the Effects of Financial Globalization (2016, neutral): “See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006), Jeske (2006), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Antràs and Caballero (2009), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), Martin and Taddei (2013),…”
• How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Equity Tunneling in Bulgaria (2010, methodology): “Prior tunneling models are highly stylized, and use a two-period framework, which does not permit one to distinguish between forms of tunneling (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1998; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, ”
• Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, background): “Prior studies demonstrate that it is less likely for managers to divert earnings or assets when there is greater legal protection (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Nenova, 2003).”